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Samuelson and the Non-Substitution Theorem: 
Some Methodological Remarks.* 
 
 
Amanar Akhabbar** 
 
 
 
With his revealed preference theory (RPT), Samuelson intended to offer “operational” 
foundations to neoclassical consumer theory by getting rid of unobservable or ill-conceived 
psychological arguments like, especially, introspection. According to Samuelson, RPT is 
operational inasmuch as utility functions are now based only on observable elements, namely 
consumed bundles of goods. In this article, we show that the same methodological process was 
implicitly applied by Samuelson to neoclassical production theory, and especially the 
production function. After defining and discussing Samuelson’s operationism, we offer a 
methodological interpretation of Samuelson’s “non-substitution theorem” (NST) as an 
operational theorem. We aim at showing that the same methodological process rules RPT and 
NST: while in RPT observable elements are bundles of goods consumed, in NST these 
elements are bundles of inputs consumed so as to measure technical coefficients; from 
observable choices by consumers and producers, one derives the corresponding behavioral or 
technological function, respectively the utility function and the production function. Therefore, 
both functions are operational concepts that offer operational foundations to both standard 
microeconomic analysis of consumption through indifference curves (deduced from the utility 
function), and to analysis of production through isoquants (deduced from the production 
function). Although Samuelson’s application of his operational-methodology-to-consumer 
theory has been studied at length, its application to production theory has been neglected. 
 
 JEL: B41, D01 
 
 
“The world takes people too much at their words.” (Samuelson, 1962, p.10) 
 
When dealing with the Pareto-Walrasian general equilibrium theory, Pascal Bridel repeatedly 
underlined that from one generation of economists to another, the methodology ruling this 
theory has been continuously changing: from Léon Walras’s idealism to Vilfredo Pareto’s 
positivism; from Paul A. Samuelson’s operationism1 to Robert E. Lucas’s instrumentalism; 
and so forth (Bridel, 1999, 2007). In this regard, one major methodological turn was the move 
from cardinalist utility functions, resting on psychological foundations, to ordinalist ones. 
Samuelson’s contribution, both methodological (introducing operationism in economics) and 
theoretical (the well-known revealed-preference theory), is probably the most important 
                                                          
* A first version of this paper was presented in July 2006 at the Meetings of the International Input-Output 
Association at Sendaï (Japan). A version of this paper was published in François Allisson and Roberto Baranzini 
(eds.) (2014) Economics and Other Branches – In the Shade of the Oak Tree, UK: Pickering and Chatto. 
** Amanar Akhabbar, ESSCA School of Management. 
1 In philosophy of science, operationism is synonymous to operationalism. See Bridgman (1927, 1938) and 
Carnap (1936, 1937). 
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(Bridel, 1999), although recent works in economics increasingly reintroduce psychological 
elements in economic theory (Bridel and Salvat, 2004). In our article we attempt at drawing a 
parallel between Samuelson’s operationalization-of-consumer theory through revealed 
preference theory, and his works in production theory from the late 1940s on, in particular the 
non-substitution theorem. 
In 1949, the non-substitution theorem (NST) was first demonstrated simultaneously 
and independently by Samuelson and Georgescu-Roegen for a so-called (static)2 “generalized 
model of Leontief.” The theorem raised the question as to whether substitutions among 
factors of production could not occur even if possible. Samuelson and Georgescu-Roegen 
showed that, although possible, in certain conditions if the structure of final demand changes, 
the structure of production remains unchanged and no factor substitution occurs. These 
special conditions are, in particular, that the economy admits (i) at most one primary factor, 
i.e., one non-produced factor of production like land; and (ii) no joint production, i.e., each 
technology produces only one outcome. The dual interpretation of the non-substitution 
theorem asserts that “under certain specified conditions an economy will have one particular 
price structure for each admissible value of the profit rate, regardless of the pattern of the final 
demand” (Salvadori, 1987, p.680). 
As a matter of fact, such specific conditions are verified in the “simple models of 
Leontief,” the famous input-output Leontief models (1937, 1944, 1949). Therefore, in such a 
model, it is relevant to assume, like in Walras’s “Theory of production” in the Éléments 
d’économie politique pure (1874–1877), constancy of technical coefficients and thus to rule 
out substitutions phenomenon. However, in a “generalized model of Leontief” (Arrow 1951, 
Dantzig 1949; Dantzig and Wood 1949; Koopmans 1951a; Samuelson 1951), one assumes 
multiple primary factors and joint products, and thus factor substitution occurs and, as a 
consequence, marginal productivity theory is verified. To Samuelson, classical political 
economy falls under the specific (restrictive) assumptions of the NST, while Pareto-Walrasian 
general-equilibrium theory falls under the generalized system. Furthermore, according to 
Samuelson, the generalized model is the relevant one to describe real economies: 
 
Ricardo and Smith would probably have admitted that the relative prices of joint products—of 
venison and skin, for example—would have to be determined by a demand theory and not 
from labor and land costs alone. One wonders why they did not worry about this “jointness,” 
which every student of Walrasian equilibrium knows to be an intrinsic part of the actual 
pricing relations among diverse factors and goods. (Samuelson, 1959, p.18) 
                                                          
2 All the analyses developed here belong to the static and a-temporal framework. 
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In a nutshell, from a theoretical point of view, non-substitution then “is here to remind 
us that it is not easy to escape the imperialism of the general equilibrium theory” (d’Autume, 
1990, p.246). The non-substitution theorem has eventually become one of the cornerstones of 
post-Walrasian general-equilibrium theory of production (Arrow, 1983; McKenzie, 2002; 
Weintraub, 1983). 
Our article deals only with Samuelson’s NST. We do not discuss the theoretical 
relevance of the NST for political economy. Instead, we are interested in the possible 
relationship between, on the one hand, Samuelson’s well-known operationist methodology 
(see Blaug, 1980; Cohen, 1995) that he developed about consumer theory, in particular the 
revealed preference theory (Samuelson, 1938a, 1938b, 1938c, 1998), and, on the other hand, 
in the realm of production theory, his demonstration of the non-substitution theorem. We ask 
the following question: given Samuelson’s operationist epistemology, is the NST an 
operational theorem? We argue in favor of a positive answer. 
 
1. “A Theorem Concerning Substitutability in Open Leontief Models” 
The non-substitution theorem was first demonstrated3 for a so-called “generalized open model 
of Leontief” (Samuelson, 1951), which is an n-industries full-employment general-
equilibrium model with exogenous final demand.4 In order to “generalize” Leontief’s model,5 
Samuelson took the same set of assumptions as Leontief except for the constancy of technical 
coefficients: the generalized-production function allows substitutions among factors of 
production. This is a generalized model of Leontief.  
Let iX  be the total output of industry i, for all i = 1 … n; ijx output of the i-th industry 
used by industry j; aij is the quantity of input i used to produce one unity of output j; and iC the 
final demand (“final output”) addressed to the i-th industry. For each industry, equilibrium 
quantity is distributed such as: 
1
n
i ij i
j
X x C

  . Labor is the n+1th commodity and is the only 
                                                          
3 Samuelson’s demonstration was first presented in 1949 at the “Linear Programming” conference organized at 
Chicago by the Cowles Commission under the direction of Tjalling C. Koopmans. Samuelson’s proof was 
published in 1951 in the Cowles Commission monograph Activity Analysis, edited by Koopmans, which 
gathered a selection of the linear programming conference papers. Afterwards, Samuelson published a series of 
papers to develop the theoretical consequences of his theorem (Samuelson, 1957, 1959a, 1959b). He also 
expanded the NST to an intertemporal framework (Samuelson, 1961). 
4 The non-substitution theorem was first named “substitution theorem.” For an interesting interpretation of this 
title change, see (Pasinetti, 1977). 
5 That is to say to allow multiple primary factors and joints production. 
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primary factor. The final demand for labor is assumed equal to zero ( 1 0nC   ), 
and 1 1
1
0
n
n n j
j
X x  

  .  
Production of each good depends on a homogenous production function (.)iF  of first 
degree (constant returns to scale). There is no joint production, thus this is a one-commodity-
per-industry economy: 1 2 1( , , ..., )i i i i n iX F x x x      . Since factor substitution is assumed, technical 
coefficients are not constant, and we deduce from the production function the following 
simple relation:  1 2, ,..., 1i i i niF a a a  . 
Given technical constraints and the available quantity of labor, and given the final demand 
for other industries, equilibrium is determined for each industry k in such a way that the final 
demand for industry k (Ck) is maximized. Each industry k, is ruled by the following 
optimization program: 
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The solution to the program is found using the Lagrange multipliers. One shows easily 
that technical coefficients are independent of the iC (final demands) of the prices and of 
1nX  (the available quantity of labor). As a consequence, even if factor substitution is possible, 
i.e., technical coefficients are not constant in such specific conditions (one primary factor, no 
joint production), the technical coefficient will not change whatever change occurs in final 
demand, prices, and availability of the primary factor. Hence, constancy of technical 
coefficients is a particular case of the general case where joint production and multiple 
primary factors allow changes in the structure of production. 
According to Samuelson, the non-substitution theorem reconciles the model of 
Leontief (constant technical coefficients and the value-added distribution is given) with the 
theory of general equilibrium (variable technical coefficients and the theory of marginal 
productivity rules income distribution). For Samuelson, “actually all his [Leontief’s] theory in 
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its present form is compatible with the more general case of substitutability” (Samuelson, 
1951, p.142–143). In other words, the situation described by the model of Leontief isn’t 
contradictory with and not exclusive of the theory of general equilibrium: it is a particular 
case of the Walrasian theory of general equilibrium. Indeed, Samuelson’s NST means that 
under certain circumstances “all desirable substitutions have already been made by the 
competitive market, and no variation in the composition of final output or in the total quantity 
of labor will give rise to price change or substitution” (Ibid. p.143); otherwise, whether the 
factors of production are substitutable, a change in final demand, relative prices, or in 
available labor, substitutions between factors occur and technical coefficients change. In a 
nutshell, the theorem raises the question of the validity of a price-quantity equilibrium 
independent of consumers’ tastes and of the structure of demand. 
 
From an epistemological point of view, the non-substitution theorem is powerful 
because it makes an initially postulated assumption (the constancy of technical coefficients) 
the consequence of a set of reduced assumptions. Indeed, while Leontief assumed the 
constancy of technical coefficients, Samuelson showed that in a generalized model of 
Leontief the constancy is true under precise conditions (only one primary factor, no joint 
production, etc.). In other words, in the generalized model of Leontief, the constancy is the 
result of a deduction from fundamental assumptions. From a logical point of view, the status 
of the theoretical proposition concerning the constancy of technical coefficients changes in 
the generalized model: this is no more an initial assumption but the result of a deduction (a 
theorem). We will show now that this theorem is an “operational” theorem according to 
Samuelson’s operationism definition. 
 
2. Deductive Methodology and Operationism: A Cambridge Methodology 
From the point of view of theoretical political economy, Samuelson’s non-substitution 
theorem is a strategic piece of the hegemonic ambitions of the general equilibrium theory. 
Now, we aim at examining the NST’s epistemological status. 
Samuelson’s methodology is well-known. The methodological criterion he chose to 
change the scientific vocabulary of economics was an operational one he defined in 1938 
(Samuelson 1938a). However, when using the operational criterion, Samuelson wasn’t alone 
in doing so. The term ‘operational’ was common in Cambridge and especially in Harvard. 
Indeed, while empirical and experimental studies had been developing in social sciences since 
the end of the 19th century, there were very different ways to articulate theory and 
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observations, even under the influence of the Vienna circle: the operational methodology is 
one of them. 
In economics, Henry Schultz (1928) was the first to allude to an operational 
methodology. According to Schultz, his demand-estimation method was “an illustration of 
what…Bridgman…has called ‘the operational procedure’ for determining the meaning of a 
concept [in this case the meaning of demand]” (1928, p.647). Indeed, the physicist Percy W. 
Bridgman, from Harvard University, developed in his book Logic of Modern Physics (1927) 
the philosophical doctrine he called operationalism (also called operationism or operational 
analysis; see Bridgman, 1938). This doctrine states that the meaning of a scientific concept is 
synonymous with the set of operations entering its definition.6 In other words, the meaning of 
a concept is given by an explicit definition of this concept stating experimental or mental 
operations of measure. This is the experimental version (and not the mentalist one) of 
Bridgman’s operationalism that was successfully exported in social sciences, psychology, and 
philosophy.7 
One particularity of operationism is that it proposes a strong relationship (synonymy) 
between theoretical terms and observational terms (direct observations or sense data), without 
distinction between induction and deduction. Nevertheless, in contrast to induction, 
operationism considers theory as necessary and requires theoretical terms to be operational, 
that is to say to be empirically meaningful (while induction is suspicious about theory). In the 
philosophy of science, Rudolf Carnap (1936, 1937),8 showed that operationism was actually 
the strong version of neopositivist verificationism. Carnap stated at the same time that 
operationism was impracticable. For the philosophy of science, Carnap’s article ended the 
operational program, although Carl Gustav Hempel, Karl Popper, and Nelson Goodman 
continued to criticize and to discuss operationism during the forties and the fifties. It also put 
an end to the until-then-flourishing verificationist program. This led to the creation of what 
Carnap called logical empiricism.9 Despite the doom of operationism in pure philosophy of 
science, the very spirit of Bridgman’s methodology became very fashionable in American 
sciences. In Cambridge (MA) again, first Samuelson (in 1938a), a student of Leontief at 
                                                          
6 In Bridgman’s words: “We mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is 
synonymous with the corresponding set of operations” (Bridgman 1927, 5, our emphasis). In economics, Schultz 
noticed: “As long as our fundamental concepts are not synonymous with corresponding sets of operations (and, 
hence, do not admit of the possibility of experimental verification), it is wrong to speak of economics as an 
experimental science.” (Schultz, 1928, 647) 
7 Behaviourism is particularly influenced by operationism. 
8 Carnap, a German citizen, emigrated in 1935 from Czechoslovakia to the United-States. Though Carnap was a 
professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago (1936-1952), he spent the years 1939-1941 at Harvard as a 
visiting professor. From 1934 on, Carnap has been close to the Harvard-professor Willard Van Orman Quine. 
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Harvard and then working at the MIT, and later Leontief (in 1949), at Harvard, alluded to the 
operational criterion. 
 
3. Samuelson’s Operational Theorems 
Samuelson first studied the neoclassical theory of demand and utility and raised the question: 
if one denies to the “hedonistic, introspective, psychological elements” explanatory value, 
“does not the whole utility analysis become meaningless in the operational sense of modern 
science?” (Samuelson, 1938a, p.344, our emphasis). The Foundations of Economic Analysis 
(1947) aimed at being a translation of economic theory into the operational language of 
science. For Samuelson, “A meaningless theory according to this criterion is one which has 
no empirical implications by which it could be refuted under ideal empirical conditions” 
(Ibid., our emphasis); and again, “It is the purpose here to demonstrate that the utility analysis 
in its ordinary form does contain empirically meaningful implications by which it could be 
refuted.” (1938a, 345, our emphasis)  
The definition Samuelson gave of his operational criteria was stable in time and he 
didn’t remove it. In 1998, Samuelson stated the following:  
 
My approach looked backward in summarizing “economically” (in the Mach-Vienna Circle 
sense) the “meaningful” (testable and, in principle, refutable) core of constrained-budget 
demand theory (Samuelson, 1998, p.1380). 
 
Samuelson’s project was to eliminate from “the theory of consumer behavior any ‘vestigial 
traces of the utility concept,’ consequently stripping consumption theory ‘to its bare 
implications for empirical realism’” (Samuelson, 1938b, p.61). According to Samuelson, this 
is that method that permits to enounce operational theorems. 
Now, it is important to underline that the definition Samuelson gave of the operational 
meaning of a theory is different from both Bridgman’s definition and Carnap’s version of 
operationism. Compared to Carnap and Bridgman’s approaches, it is controversial to state 
whether the methodology Samuelson adopted was based on a meaning criterion or a 
falsification criterion (see Blaug, 1980; Cohen, 1995; Mongin, 2000; Akhabbar, 2007a, 
2007b; Hands, 2008). Blaug (1980) argued that Samuelson’s operationalism was a mixture of 
empiricism and falsificationism.10 Although commentators agree about the radical difference 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9 We consider in what follows that Carnap’s version of operationism is the general one (and not Bridgman’s). 
10 Karl Popper is considered as the father of falsificationism. This methodology doesn’t permit to find the 
empirical meaning of a concept but only to say if it is a scientific one and if it is not yet falsified. 
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between Bridgman’s and Samuelson’s operationism, there is no consensus about the 
falsificationist nature of the latter: for instance, Cohen (1995) rejected Blaug’s position. To 
reject the falsificationist interpretation of Samuelson’s operationist methodology, Cohen 
argues that Popper’s book Die Logik der Firschung (The Logic of Scientific Discovery), 
published in 1934, was translated in English late in the fifties (1959), and he assumes that 
Samuelson didn’t read it. Now, on a pure epistemological stage, Samuelson’s definition is 
clearly not the one of operational methodology, but is a version of falsificationism: according 
to such a methodology, theory doesn’t need direct correspondence with data but only indirect 
empirical implications in order to be (possibly) refuted. 
To our demonstration about the operationality of the NST, it is not important to determine or 
choose one or another interpretation of Samuelson’s epistemology. This will not affect our 
result. From now, we will consider that operationism is in the first place the methodology 
Samuelson practically implemented in revealed preference theory (RPT), and we will show 
that the same methodology was implemented in the NST. 
 
4. Operational Theorems: From Revealed Preference Theory to NST 
Samuelson first applied his so-called operationist methodology to (neoclassical) consumer 
theory. To bring empirical implications to the theory of consumer, Samuelson chose to start 
his analyses with the data consumers reveal in the marketplace. The utility function is then the 
one maximized that corresponds to the revealed preference. This function is a transitive and 
complete ordinal utility function, which satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference. 
Ordinal utility is then purged from introspection and gets an operational meaning, according 
to Samuelson: the function is defined “as that which is maximized by means of revealing 
preferences in the market place” (Cohen, 1995, p.66). 
 
This is clearly the same principle employed in the theory of revealed preference and the 
non-substitution theorem: given prices—assumed to be “parameters not subject to influence 
by the individual” noticed Samuelson (1938b, 62)—the explanation of empirical data, namely 
actual technical coefficients (or consumed quantities) is expressed as an optimization 
program11 of a derivable mathematical function, namely final net output (or utility function) 
under constraints, here the production function and the quantities equilibrium (or budgetary 
constraint). Let’s note that in the NST, the production function actually appears in the 
objective function since, for each industry k, one maximizes consumption Ck where 
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 ))(( kjkk xXFC , F(-) being the production function. Therefore, in the NST, like in 
revealed preference theory, the unknown objective function is to be found. In both 
optimization problems, to solve the program, the method of Lagrangean multipliers is used.  
On the one hand, the non-substitution theorem shows that a production function with 
substitution exists that induces under certain circumstances constant technical coefficients 
(one observes constant technical coefficients) and that induces under other circumstances 
variable technical coefficients (one observes the variation of technical coefficients). On the 
other hand, in the same way as the production function obtains an operational meaning by its 
references to variations of measurable technical coefficients, the utility function gains 
empirical significance once leaving mysterious allusions to introspection.12  
In microeconomics textbook language, Samuelson’s analysis starts with observable point, 
namely bundles of goods. In the entirety of this paragraph, we assume given prices. In the 
realm of production theory, the problem is as follows: given observable bundles of inputs, 
what is the corresponding operational production function? In the realm of consumer theory, 
the problem is as follows: given observable bundles of goods, what is the corresponding 
operational utility function? Indeed, given prices, on a two-axis diagram one represents 
quantities of input A and of input B required to produce x units of commodity X;  this point 
gives a measure of one technical coefficient of the production function of commodity X. One 
may represent the isoquant passing by this observable point. The isoquant is not observable in 
reality while the technical coefficient may be measured. Given assumptions on the production 
function and given a series of observable input vectors (A,B), one deduces the (derivable) 
production function, x=F(A,B). This is the operational analysis of the production function. In 
the same way, when one deals with consumer acts, given prices, one observes and measures 
the consumed quantities of commodities X and Y. On a two-axis diagram, one represents 
consumed quantities of X and consumed quantities of Y. One may represent the indifference 
curve passing by this observable point (X,Y). The indifference curve is not observable in 
reality while the consumed bundle of goods X and Y is observable. Given assumptions on the 
utility function and given a series of observable bundles of goods (X,Y), one deduces the 
(derivable) utility function, u=G(X,Y). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 About the epistemological status of the optimization process, see Samuelson (1972). 
12 Samuelson’s methodology is understandable as a methodology concerning the validity of assumptions. Here, 
he replaced an unoperational assumption (a function of utility based on introspection) by an operational 
assumption (a utility function based on market data). 
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These functions (the production function and the utility function) are operational by 
means of indirect references to observation: this is the deductive method and not the canonical 
operational method of Carnap and Bridgman. Indeed, Carnap’s operational methodology 
requires direct correspondences between concepts and observation: to gain an operational 
meaning the mathematical function must be defined by synonymous measure operations… 
which is not the case.13 But the mathematical functions obtained by Samuelson are 
operational according to Samuelson’s operational criterion. Samuelson’s methodology lies on 
two stages: (1) enunciation of minimal (‘economical’) assumptions under which rest 
deduction and calculation and (2) expression of the explanation of the problem as an 
optimization program. Ultimately then, the non-substitution theorem is operational according 
to Samuelson’s definition of the operational meaning of a theory, but this definition is 
completely different from the one Carnap proposed. On the other hand, Samuelson’s criterion 
is falsificationist (close to Popper) and corresponds to the one proposed by Koopmans (1947) 
at the Cowles Commission: the empirical content (and not operational meaning) of a 
hypothetic-deductive theory comes from the singular statements (observable) deduced from 
the general assumptions. 
 
5. Conclusion: Samuelson and a Symmetric Operationist Theory of Value? Operational 
Theorems for Consumption Theory and Production Theory 
In this article we have shown that Samuelson applied the same methodological approach to 
both the economic theory of consumption and the economic theory of production: he intended 
to offer operational concepts to build economic theory on new and operational foundations. 
On the consumer theory side, Samuelson produced the revealed preference theory as the 
operational theory of ordinalist utility analysis. As such, he aimed at getting rid of the 
psychological basis of utility theory: the utility function was nothing more than an artifact 
reproducing the observable consumed bundles of goods. On the production theory side, 
Samuelson grounded controversial-factor substitutability on (expectedly) uncontroversial 
operational-production functions: the opposition between, on the one hand, classical and 
Marxian political economy (rejecting substitutability and assuming complementary factors), 
and so-called neoclassical theories was expected to vanish under the effect of operational 
theorems of production, beginning with the non-substitution theorem. True or false, the non-
substitution theorem is operational. 
                                                          
13 As noticed above, in contrast to Bridgman’s operationism, Samuelson’s methodology is not based on a 
meaning criterion. 
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